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Abstract
While over-nancing caused crises and slow growth in advanced economies including Ger-
many, France and the UK after 2008, more prudent nancial deepening sustained higher eco-
nomic growth in China and India - two major emerging economies in the world. The ac-
tual nancial deepening ratios (AFDR) observed in the non-consolidated balance-sheet from
the OECD exceeded by factors of 3.5, 2.4 and 5.1 to the optimal nancial deepening ratios
(OFDR) obtained from the solutions of dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models of those
three advanced economies. The corresponding factors were 2.3 and 0.49 for China and India
respectively. Labour intensive production technology and a low OFDR relative to a high AFDR
in China allowed it to grow at 10 percent during the period of recent global nancial crisis.
With a reasonable OFDR and low AFDR India also managed to grow at 6.5 percent. Thus huge
gaps between the optimal and actual nancial deepening ratios led to massive macroeconomic
consequences as observed after the crises in 2008. Smooth, sustainable and e¢ cient economic
growth requires adoption of strategies for separating equilibria in line of Miller-Stiglitz-Roth
mechanisms avoiding problems of asymmetric information in the process of nancial interme-
diation with as narrower gaps as possible between the AFDRs and OFDRs.
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1 Introduction
Economic crisis of 2008 began with the bursting of the housing market bubble and the credit crisis
in the USA and spread around the globe. The Germany, France, UK and other countries in the EU,
US and Japan and many other advanced countries were hit hard by the recession. It lowered growth
rates and other economic activities in these countries. Output, employment, investment, capital
accumulation, exports and imports shrank causing alarming loses of income and deteriorations in
living standards of households. Many business rms failed or prot prospects of small, medium
and large scale rms became bleak. Governments in these countries initially chose to stimulate
the aggregate demand by expanding the public expenditure and cutting taxes bearing increased
risks of larger public debts. Central banks reduced the basic interest rate to a record low rate
since the beginning of central banking (on January 2009 Federal fund rate has remained close to
zero, Bank of Englands basic rate is 0.5 percent for ve years since 2009; the ECB had adopted
similar strategy) in order to expand the liquidity is the system. Credit levels of banks were expanded
under the quantitative easing (QE) to compensate for austerity in public spending programmes that
accompanied debt reduction programmes in following years. It was surprising to see this nancial
crisis had little e¤ects on growth rates in the major emerging developing economies such as China
and India. China was growing around 10 percent annually and India above 6 percent while France,
Germany and UK were in deep recession of about 5 percent. Comparing the results on optimal
nancial deepening ratios (OFDR) implied by the dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models of
France, Germany, UK, China and India to the actual nancial deepening ratio (AFDR) observed
in the data from the unconsolidated balance sheets, we argue that while over nancing, the nature
of casino capitalism, was the cause of long slump in the advanced OECD countries, the optimal or
prudent nancing brought stability and growth in emerging economies.
Which comes rst: the nancial development or economic growth? Classical economists had
put capital accumulation at the centre of economic growth. For them higher degree of nancial
deepening through saving and investment activities promotes the level of income and raises the
rates of economic growth. No economist can disagree that the economic advancement is impossible
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without a reasonable degree of nancial deepening as measured in the ratios of capital stock to GDP.
The process of capital accumulation and growth in advanced or emerging economies is enhanced
substantially by the nancial markets that channel the resources of millions of risk adverse savers
to millions of risk neutral borrowers (Fama (2014), Shiller (2014)). Schumpeter (1911) opined that
the nancial development was a pre-condition for economic growth but Robinson (1952) viewed
that the nancial development is a by-product of economic growth process. Using four indicators of
nancial development for about 119 countries for 1960 to 1989 King and Levine (1993) had shown
empirical support for the Schumpeterian hypothesis that nancial development leads to economic
growth over time in contrast to the Robinsonian argument that growth rate of output had little
connection to the levels of developments of the nancial sector.
Importance of risk minimisation and e¢ ciency of portfolio allocation are at the heart of nancial
optimisation. Early studies of Sproul (1947), Smith (1958) and Chiang (1959) in this line were
instrumental in development of the dynamic general equilibrium framework by Sidrauski (1967)
and Tobin (1969) who found correspondence between the balance sheet of the nancial system to
economic growth. Taking inspirations from a theory of Banking rm in Klein (1971), Shaw (1973)
had described the role and process of nancial deepening in developing countries illustrating the
role of saving and investment in economic development. His propositions were tested by McKinnon
(1973), Fry (1978), Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996), Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996)
and King and Levine (1993) and Levine (1997) by assessing impacts of nance in economic growth
empirically across countries. Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2010) and Davies et al. (2010) found that
the uctuations in the banking system were cause of recessions in UK in the past three centuries.
Earlier studies on the analysis of causes and consequences of bank-runs (Diamond and Dybvig
(1983)), existence of informal nance (Bolnick(1987)), stochastic factors (Boyd and Prescott (1986))
also support that structure of nancial system should be right for economic growth (Townsend
(1983), and Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999)). Theoretical analysis on liquidity of the banking
sector in Epstein and Zin (1989), Fama (1980), Spencer (1984), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992)
were empirically validated in more recent works on role of nancial sector in economic growth by
Giovanni and de Melo (1993), Bank of England (1999, 2001), Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel
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(2001), Raghuram and Zingales (1998), Radelet, Sachs, Cooper and Bosworth (1998), Friedman
(2005), Spencer (2008), Gai, Kapadia, Millard and Perez (2008), Cecchetti (2009), Brunnermeier
(2009), Taylor (2010). They conclude that the economic growth is impossible without the growth
of the nancial sector.
The second round of literature in nancial deepening and growth took the form of strategic mod-
elling of bargaining a-la Nash (1951). Signalling and coalition formation problem of Shapley (1953)
and Shapley and Shubik (1969) and mechanism design from Rogerson (1985), Rasmusen (1987),
Milde and Riley (1988), Beaudry and Poitevin (1995), Riley (2001), Cripps (1997), Dasgupta and
Maskin (2000) and Roth (2008) have been increasingly applied to assess consequences of adverse
selection and moral hazard problems in the nancial markets. Consequences of transaction cost in
bilateral and multilateral negotiations of Balasko (2003), Kiyotaki and Moore (2006)) and nan-
cial deepening (Townsend and Ueda (2006)) shed further lights on neoclassical and neo-Keynesian
modeling of linking nancial sectors to economic growth in King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994),
Wickens (1995), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), Chadha and Nolan (2002) and Covas and
Den Haan (2012) subsequently.
General equilibrium impacts of nance on economic growth got special attention in Greenwood
and Javanovic (1990), Mercenier and Srinivasan ed. (1994), Altig, Carlstrom and Lansing (1995),
Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997) and Bhattarai (1997). There has been resurgence of interest in the
relation between the nancial deepening and economic growth recently (Greenwood and Scharfstein
(2013), Farmer (2013)) in structural changes (Pilbeam, Olmo and Pouliot (2011), Levine, Pearlman,
Perendia and Yang (2013)) after the nancial crisis of 2008.
Various studies exist on the evaluation of impacts of nancial sector in the economy (Altig et
al. (1995), Bacchetta (1992), Bank of England (1999), Brunnermeier (2009), Cecchetti (2009),
Champ et al. (1996), Giovanni and de Melo (1993), De Fraja (1991) and Mayer et al. (2009)).
How the asymmetry of information on depositors and savers results in volatilities of unimaginable
proportions in these markets and a¤ect the choices of economic agents and prospects of economies
is analysed using theoretical models and empirical evidences. Financial markets often experience
catastrophic failures whenever the expectations of lenders and borrowers do not match market
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Table 1: Financial Deepening in Three EU Economies and in China and India
France Germany United Kingdom China India
FA Y FA/Y FA Y FA/Y FA Y FA/Y FA Y FA/Y FA Y FA/Y
2007 20.52 1.89 10.88 19.34 2.43 7.96 21.27 1.41 15.06 30.9 20.3 1.52 30.2 42.5 0.71
2008 19.44 1.93 10.06 19.54 2.47 7.90 28.80 1.44 19.66 33.9 22.3 1.52 33.6 44.2 0.76
2009 20.39 1.89 10.81 19.75 2.37 8.32 24.90 1.40 17.76 43.5 24.3 1.79 37.4 47.9 0.78
2010 21.31 1.94 11.00 20.40 2.50 8.17 26.92 1.47 18.36 48.7 26.9 1.81 40.3 53.0 0.76
2011 21.97 2.00 10.98 20.80 2.59 8.02 29.01 1.52 19.14 55.1 29.3 1.88 43.4 56.3 0.77
D a t a S o u r c e : O E C D (n a t io n a l a c c o u n t s s e c t io n ) a n d W o r ld B a n k (W B ID ) . FA = N o n - c o n s o l id a t e d F in a n c ia l A s s e t s a n d Y = G D P b o th in Tr i l l i o n s
FA a n d G D P a r e in Tr i l l i o n s o f N a t io n a l C u r r e n c i e s .
realities (Friedman (2005), King (1994), Klein (1971), Krugman (1979), Milde and Riley (1988),
Prescott and Townsend (1984), Rasmusen (1987), Riley (2001), Rogerson (1985), Sargent (1987),
Smith (1958), Spencer (1984), Stiglitz, and Weiss (1981), Sinn (2009, 2010), Miller and Stiglitz
(2010), Farmer (2013)). These studies, however, have had not su¢ ciently addressed on how the
nancial deepening has impacted on growth. Problems with saving and loan associations in 1980
in the USA, bank runs and failures of giant banks in Japan in 1990s or the collapse of credit and
housing markets in the USA and several EU economies recently, with their consequences across the
globe are good examples. The credit crunch, bank failures, liquidity crises, stock market crash and
bailouts in the UK, EU and USA starting in October, 2008 are recent problems.
Empirical facts emerging from the non-consolidated balance sheets1 from the OECD and World
Bank summarised in Table 1 provide a basis for the over-nancing hypothesis in case of advanced
economies and under-developed but prudent structure of the nancial sector in case of emerging
economies. The nancial deepening ratios (FA/Y) - ratio of nancial assets to the GDP, are twice
as large in the UK than those in Germany (19.1 and 8.0 respectively). Financial deepening ratios
of France around 11, are higher than those of Germany but much smaller than those of the UK.
The (FA/Y) - ratios are signicantly lower for China (1.88) and very low for India (0.77) compared
to those in advanced economies indicating that excess leveraging problems do not appear in case of
these emerging economies.
The long run growth is a function of real physical capital not the nancial leverages or deriva-
1The non-consolidated nancial assets include currency and deposits, nancial derivatives, securities, shares and
equities.
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tives that promote the articial nancial deepening. Over-nancing phenomenon has become more
serious in the last two decades in advanced countries. Our general equilibrium computations shows
that there is little di¤erence among advanced economies on the real or optimal nancial deepening
but a large di¤erences on the element of casino capitalism (Sinn 2009, 2010) or asset bubbles and
collective illusion (Miller and Stiglitz (2010)). As Farmer (2013) shows these bubbles have adverse
consequences on growth particularly when asset prices are as unbounded as above. Mallick and
Sousa (2013) show real adverse e¤ects of nancial stress created by over expansionary low interest
rate policy in the Euro zone using the Bayesian structural VAR and a sign-restriction VAR mod-
els. Table 1 also implies that level of nancial development is still at the early stage in emerging
economies particularly in India with the ratio of nancial assets to GDP just around 77 percent,
lower than 38 times compared to that in the UK.
This paper shows how economies are vulnerable to over-nancing which causes wide ranging
ine¢ ciencies, uctuations in growth of output and other economic activities from time to time.
Starting from a simple prototype model of nance in endogenous growth of Pagano (1993) and
Bhattarai (2005) type models in section 2 it proceeds to the dynamic multisectoral and multi-
household dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models of Germany, France, UK, China and India
in section 3. Aim of this exercise is to make judgement on over or under nancing hypothesis
by comparing how the e¢ cient and optimal paths of capital output ratios implied by the dynamic
general equilibrium models to the ratios of nancial assets to GDP as recorded in the balance sheets
of the central banks or the OECD. The conclusions and references are in the nal section.
2 Dynamic Process of Capital Accumulation
On each trading day nancial markets open with sets of assets for transaction, bid-o¤er processes
set the prices of those assets. In theory, exchanges take place at the core which is a non-blocking
coalition or Pareto optimal equilibrium in which it is not possible to make one person better o¤
without making another person worse-o¤. The contract curve is the set of Pareto e¢ cient points at
the core. The rst and second theorems of welfare economics conrm that the price mechanism in
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a free market economy generates optimal and e¢ cient allocation of resources to economic agents.
Similarly the core in a bargaining game and the non-blocking coalition are consistent to rationalities
of individuals, groups and coalition involved in the trade. By supper-additivity property of coalition
economic gains are maximised under the coalition than by playing alone. It seems that nancial
markets are prone to coalitions and crises when economic agents play zero sum non-cooperative
games without paying any attention to benets of coalition and cooperation (Gale (1986)). Even
when the agreements are made for cooperation, questions remain on whether such coalitions are
stable and sustainable. There are always tendencies in these nancial markets for one player to
cheat others in order to raise personal gain under information asymmetry in the short run. However,
it is unlikely that any player can fool all others in the long run. They will discover such cheating in
subsequent periods. It results in lack of trusts and collapse of the nancial markets. This is what
happened during the nancial crisis.
Economic models characterise the optimal allocation of resources as a result of the complex bid
and o¤er interactions among economic agents. Their preferences are non-satiable, strictly convex
and continuous. Debreu and Scarf (1963) had proven the equivalence of a competitive equilibrium
to the core of the game for economies with and without production by contradiction. Scarf (1967)
theorem states that a balanced n person game has a non-empty core that is equivalent to the
allocation at the core in the competitive equilibrium. He stated an exchange economy with convex
preferences always gives rise to a balanced n person game and such will always have a non-empty
core (Scarf (1967)). Theoretical generalisations of a dynamic general equilibrium model based on
classical assumptions or of the coalition and bargaining games, may be summarised using a diagram
as in Figure 1 where the E-E is allocations at the core, LL is the market valuations of lenders; BB is
the market valuation of borrowers. Deviations in the position of borrowers (BB) and lenders (LL)
from the dynamically e¢ cient equilibrium path (EE) reect subjective di¤erences in the assessment
of prospects of nancial assets. This is the reason for trades among lenders and borrowers. Wide
uctuations in these were the sources of cycles that were observed during the nancial crisis that
started in 2008.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium and Core in Asset Markets Over Time
The main intuitive points could be summarised as:
1. Assets are results of consumption saving behavior resulting from the intertemporal optimisa-
tion of households or rms.
2. There is an equilibrium allocation path, EE, for each time period of the economy that is at
the core of the equilibrium.
3. Lenders and borrowers start with di¤erent amounts of endowments and bargain continuously
in order to gain more from the transaction, along LL and BB paths.
4. Underlying productivity and preferences cause di¤erentiations in valuation by the buyers and
sellers in asset markets. Therefore the valuation can be generalised in n number of cases.
5. Corrective measures are taken by individuals or the policy makers when these valuations
signicantly deviate away from the underlying equilibrium, destabilising the whole nancial
system.
6. The asset accumulation proles can contain overlapping generations and have innite lives in
contrast to individual traders with nite lives.
7. There are gains from trading in the nancial markets. Whether the lenders or the borrowers
get the larger shares of this gain depends on their bargaining power and prospects of credible
coalitions, which keep changing with time.
Above dynamic economy can be expressed with a simple stochastic technology Yt = ztKt ,
where zt  N
 
0; 2

represents the stochastic shocks in spirit of Wickens (1995) or Price (1997) or
more recently in Levine et al. (2013). Capital accumulation takes the form It = Kt+1  (1  )Kt,
and amount of investment deviates from saving depending on the e¢ ciency of nancial markets
(0 <  < 1), It = St. Assuming market clearing Yt = Ct + St and a steady economy Kt+1 =
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Table 2: Endogenous growth with nancial e¢ ciency
Parameters   y0 z s
CIA 0:02 0:95 1 (0:15; 0:05) 0:15
(1 + g)Kt; IY =
S
Y and the parameters z; ; s and  in Table 2 determine the growth rate of the
economy as shown in Fig. 2 that shows how the growth rates (measured in verticle axis) move over
time (horizontal axis shows t1 to t100 periods) .
g = z
I
Y
   = zs   (1)

* It = St = (1 + g)Kt   (1  )Kt = (g + )K = (g + ) Yz

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Figure 2: Fluctuations in growth rate due to the TFP shocks
I t c a u s e s u c t u a t io n s in t h e l e n d in g a n d b o r r ow in g a c t iv i t i e s . I t a ¤ e c t s t h e p r o c e s s o f s a v in g , in v e s tm e n t a n d c a p i t a l a c c um u la t io n .
It is important to show that nancial and real sectors of the economy are mirror images of each
other using an asset accumulation equation as:
At (1 + brt) +Wt   Ct = At+1 (2)
where Ct is consumption, At nancial assets, Wt endowment, and brt+1 return to asset net of
tax and depreciation rate; brt = (1  k) (r   ) with r the real interest rate,  rate of depreciation
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and k capital income tax. When k = 0; (2) can be re-written as:
Atrt +Wt   Ct   fAt+1   (1  )Atg = 0 (3)
Now replacing At by Kt and using denition of income Yt = Atrt +Wt = Ct + It
Yt   Ct   (Kt+1   (1  )Kt) = 0; =)=) Yt = Ct + It (4)
Thus the stocks of nancial assets must balance to the stocks of physical capital in an economy
but their values are sensitive to market conditions. In theory, mechanisms of incentive compatible
contracts contained in Maskin and Tirole (1990) and Roth (2008) could be applied to separate
normal borrower and lenders from risky ones under asymmetric information to solve moral hazard
or adverse selection problems required to e¢ cient equilibrium path EE by minimising gaps in
their evaluations as shown above by LL and BB lines in Figure 1. Kiyotaki and Moore (2006)
illustrate importance of the bilateral and multilateral commitment in maintaining the e¢ ciency of
the nancial system (). In a growth model with money Sidrauski (1967) had provided a general
equilibrium model of growth with nance. However it is our view that policy analyses should be
based in more detailed assessment of the structural features of the economy as found in the micro-
consistent dataset for consumption, production, public sector and trade. A DGE model of nancial
deepening with realistic micro-foundation for analysis of e¢ ciency, growth and redistribution is the
best model for such analysis as discussed in the next section.
3 Finance in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model
A dynamic general equilibrium model properly accounts for the intertemporal preferences of house-
holds between the current and future consumption (and saving), long run decision of investors in
accumulating capital and the policies of government that often distorts positively or negatively and
a¤ects on choices of rms and households. With the increasing level of globalisation, capital now
ows more swiftly from one country to another causing volatility in the values of nancial assets,
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causing bubbles as shown by Miller and Stiglitz (2010) or Sinn (2010). It does not settle down
until the investors nd the best return from their investments. It frequently results in runs, panics
or exuberances as shown in Figures 1 and 2 above. Theoretical analysis is found in Greenwood
and Boyan (1990), Fama (1980), Levine (1997), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Epstein and Zin (1989),
Townsend (1983)), Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000),
Raghuram and Zingales (1998), Benarji and Basu (2009), econometric studies in Arestis, Demetri-
ades and Luintel (2001), and Pilbeam et al. (2011) but very few applied works exist for the nancial
sector in a dynamic general equilibrium context (Mercenier and Srinivasan (1994)). Therefore it is
pertinent to present a generic structure of a dynamic general equilibrium model here and to apply
it to France, Germany and the UK as well as to China and India to study long run impacts of
nancial deepening, particularly in nding how over-nancing in advanced countries compares to
more prudent nancing in emerging economies.
3.1 Consumers
Consumers are forward looking in the model. They are interested in smoothing out their life time
consumption in order to guarantee a certain level of utility or standard of life for each period in
their life, given inter-temporal discount factors h. This requires intertemporal optimisation over
the life time, maximising lifetime utility
 
Uh0

as in (5) given the life-time income (7) and budget
constraints (8).
Uh0 =
1X
t=1
thU
h
t ; 0 < 
t
h < 1 (5)
Uht = U
 
Chi;t; L
h
t ;c

(6)
Each consumer starting from initial endowment of physical capital
 
Kh0

and labour time
 
LSh0

makes decision to consume
 
Chi

and work

LSht = L
h
t   Lht

and save from its full income
 
Iht

in each period leaving it to the banking system to channel those savings to the potential investors.
The life time income
 
Ih0

of household h:
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Ih0 =
" 1X
t=0
e t
NX
i=1

Pi;t (1 + ti)C
h
i;t
	
+ wht (1  tl)Lht
#
(7)
=
1X
t=0
e tIht =
" 1X
t=0
wht (1  tl)L
h
t + rt (1  tk)Kht
#
Households supply factors of production, capital and labour, Kht and LS
h
t , to rms. They
receive net of tax wage income in return to labour supply [ wht (1  tl)LSht ] and capital income
[rt (1  tk)Kht ] in return to their investment. They pay taxes on their capital and labour incomes
and receive transfer payments
 
Rht

from the government on the mean tested basis.
TX
t=0
NX
i=1
Pi;t
 
1 + thci

Chi;t =
TX
t=0

rt (1  tk)Kht +Rht + wht (1  tl)LSht

(8)
Households take market price of commodities (Pi;t), wage rates
 
wht

and the rental rate (rt) as
given while solving their own problem.
3.2 Firms
Firms are central to the supply of goods and services. Given the production technology optimal
choices of inputs are made to maximise prot in each period and over the model horizon. Entry and
exit is allowed with regulations to maintain a competitive economy. Therefore in each period, rms
compare prices of inputs and products ( ri;t; wht ; pi;t; pei;t; pmi;t) and determine the optimum level
of output that would maximise inputs. Implicitly the level of output depends on relative prices of
inputs and outputs, technology and elasticity parameters as:
Yi;t = Fi

Ki;t
 
ri;t; w
h
t ; pi;t

; p; Li
 
wht ; pi;t

; Ai; c

(9)
TX
t=0
Pi;tYi;t =
TX
t=0
"
rt (1 + tk)Ki;t +
HX
h=i
wht (1 + tl)L
h
i;t
#
(10)
The structure of inputs and levels of technology may di¤er for rms operating in di¤erent sectors
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- agriculture, manufacturing, services, but all of them are interested to maximise total prot given
the process of capital accumulation, Ki;t = (1  i;t)Ki;t 1 + Ii;t.
3.3 Trade
Economies modelled here are price takers in the global market except that they need to balance
their trade over time. Adjustment in the real exchange rates brings such balance in the value of
imports [
TP
t=0
NP
i=1
PMi;tMi;t] and exports [
TP
t=0
NP
i=1
PEi;tEi;t] and net ows of capital [ FLt].
TX
t=0
NX
i=1
PEi;tEi;t =
TX
t=0
NX
i=1
PMi;tMi;t (11)
or,
NX
i=1
PEi;tEi;t  
NX
i=1
PMi;tMi;t =  FLt (12)
Real exchange rate the ratio of weighted aggregate price indices of imports and exports are
determined by PEi;t and PMi;t and thus were results of the ows of imports and exports.
3.4 Government
Government provides public services like law and order, education and health, social security and
pension and protection of environment to households and rms and adds to the public capital
by investing in economic infrastructure, health and education. These expenditures (Gt) enhance
productivity of workers and make these economies more competitive in the global market. In a
dynamic economy the public spending should balance to the public revenue as shown in (13).
1X
t=0
e tRVt 7
1X
t=0
e t
 
Gt +R
h
t

(13)
and,
RVt =
HX
h=1
NX
i=1
Pi;tt
h
ciC
h
i;t +
NX
i=1
HX
h=i
 
wht tlL
h
i;t + rt (1 + tk)Ki;t

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Government collects revenue (RVt) through direct taxes on income of households and rms and
indirect taxes on their consumption. The optimal levels of public expenditure and revenues are set
when the benets from the public spending equal the costs of public funds in equilibrium.
3.5 General equilibrium in markets
A competitive equilibrium in these economies are given by a set of relative price system ( ri;t; wht ;
pi;t; pei;t; pmi;t) and allocations, (Chi;t , Yi;t , Ki;t , Ii;t ; Ei;t , Mi;t; L
h
t ; LS
h
t ) that are consistent
to optimisation problem of households and rms as stated in (5) and (9) given their constraints
(7) and (10). Financial assets (Fi;t, Ft) are mirror e¤ects of physical assets (Ki;t, Kt). Thus the
dynamic economy is run e¢ ciently by the market clearing relative price system as the prices of
commodities and services and factors of production continue to adjust until demands are balanced
to supplies in each market.
3.6 Financial Deepening
Optimal nancial deepening (Ft) is the result of the growth process in the economy and is derived
from the optimal nancial deepening across production sectors (Fi;t) through investment and saving
activities. These reect the real book (market) values of stocks and bonds of rms operating in
these industries. Banks channel funds saved by households or enterprises for investment by rms
at the real interest rate that matches cost and productivity of funds to the rms. The degree of
real nancial deepening then is indicated by the ratio of capital stocks to the GDP.
Ft =
Kt
Yt
; Fi;t =
Ki;t
Yi;t
; Ft =
NX
i=1
Fi;t; Kt =
NX
i=1
Ki;t; Yt =
NX
i=1
Yi;t (14)
This real measure of optimal nancial deepening, resulting from the optimisation behavior of con-
sumers and rms in the economy, should equal to the ratio of nancial assets to GDP in the nancial
market in an ideal world. Such intertemporal equilibria is guaranteed by the exibility of prices,
wages and interest rates in the economy. Imbalances either due to the rigid or inexible prices cause
market imperfections or crises.
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Good nancial policies result in right set of accumulation process and higher growth rate of
the economy over periods. Wrong nancial sector policies lead to mismatch between the volumes
borrowed and lent, that often manifests in terms of bail outs or subsidies or preferential treatment of
one sector against another. These imbalances distort the accumulation process ultimately reducing
the prospects of the economy in the long run.
4 Optimal verses Actual Financial Deepening Ratios
The applied general equilibrium model stated above was used to assess prospects of nancial devel-
opment in three economies each of which consisted of eleven sectors of goods and services, capital
assets di¤erentiated by sectors and labour di¤erentiated by skills. Each model has a horizon of
seventy ve years from 2006 to 2080.
The micro-consistent data for this model is taken from the input output table published by the
OECD in 2006 for Germany, France, UK, China and India (Appendix Tables C1 - C5 available
upon request). This data set provides information on the actual values for demand supply balances
of rms, revenue and expenditure of the government, saving and investment balance for the private
sector and the export-import balance for the economy.
A number of assumptions are made regarding the nature of the steady states among these
economies. First, the bench mark rate of return on capital stock is chosen to be the natural
rate of interest (r) for each country. Information about the rate of deprecation of capital (i) in
each sector is obtained from the historical data and tested with sensitivity analyses. The steady
state growth rates (gi) are made consistent with the historical growth rates for each sector. The
parametric values of r; i and gi dene the reference path of the economy. Elasticities of substitution
in consumption (c) and production (p) are based on the literature. Fundamentals to all these
rest on the optimising behavior of households regarding the division of labour between leisure
 
Lht

and work
 
LSht

and division of income between consumption
 
Cht

and saving
 
Sht

. Tax rates and
transfers

tc; tw; tk; R
h
t
	
are retained for all sectors except for the nancial and real estate sectors
in the counter factual analyses. Model is applied for policy analysis only after the calibration of
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Table 3: Optimal and actual nancial deepening ratios and growth rates for 2008-2009
Parameters OFDR AFDR OFR (%) GR 2008-12
France 3.16 10.98 3.5 (7.8) 0.11
Germany 3.31 8.02 2.4 (4.7) 0.77
UK 3.24 19.12 5.1 (15.9) -0.60
China 0.81 1.88 2.3 (1.1) 9.30
India 1.54 0.78 0.49 (-0.8) 6.50
N o t e : O F D R a n d A F D R a r e o p t im a l a n d a c t u a l n a n c ia l d e e p e in g r a t io s ; O F R ov e r n a n c in g r a t io
the benchmark economies.
4.1 Balance-sheet FA ratios compared to optimal capital deepening ra-
tios
The general equilibrium theory provides a very solid framework for analysis of results obtained by
solving for more than 14 thousand variables simultaneously for France, Germany, UK, China and
India. Results on optimal and actual nancial deepening, the ratios of nancial assets to GDP,
relevant for this paper are summarised in Table 3 (Detailed solutions of these models in excel to be
available upon request.)
The overall optimal real nancial deepening ratios (OFDR) from the general equilibrium models,
as presented in Table 3, are consistent across countries; these are found to be higher for advanced
countries at around 3.16 in France, 3.31 in Germany and 3.24 for the UK. These are lower for
emerging economies at around 0.81 for China due to primarily labour intensive production process
but 1.54 for India which seems to be more capital intensive in production than China. These
are sensible results and consistent to the converging patterns of economic growth across advanced
countries.
The actual ratios of nancial deepening (AFDR) reported in Table 1 earlier based on gures
from the OECDs non-consolidated balance sheets for France, Germany and the UK were 10.98, 8.02
and 19.12 respectively. These ratios exceeded by factors of 3.5, 2.4 and 5.1 than the optimal ratios
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computed from the solutions of the general equilibrium models for France, Germany and the UK
respectively as shown in the OFR (over nancing ratios) in Table 3. In other words the overnancing
in these countries amount to 7.8, 4.7 and 15.9 times of GDP respectively as shown in the parenthesis
in the OFR column. The actual nancial deepening ratios (AFDR) were much lower for emerging
economies. It was around 1.88 in China and 0.89 in India. The discrepancy between the real and
the nominal magnitudes of nancial deepening gives credibility to the hypothesis that UK economy
is more vulnerable to nancial crises as it has more assets originating from the nancial derivatives
and more subject to the problems caused by asymmetric information. China is overnanced by
1.1 times of GDP. India is undernanced up to 80 percent of its GDP; the OFR of 0.49 indicates
serious level of under nancing in India. The OFR of 2.3 for China means that it is over-nanced
by a factor of 2.3. Nevertheless the degree of over-nancing is twice as much in the UK with the
OFR of 5.1 than in China.
Economic growth rates in these models are driven by fundamentals of the nancial markets based
on the net present value calculations and portfolio selections satisfying the arbitrage conditions
across markets. These contain risk-return analysis to minimise risks and maximise returns and
insurances to cover unforeseen contingencies. The supply of funds arises from inter-temporal utility
maximising consumers and demand for funds for investment originates from prot maximising
producers. Subjective discount factors of consumers and depreciation rates of capital are balanced
by the real interest rates so that funds are allocated according to the marginal utilities of households
or productivities of rms across various sectors leaving regulatory roles to the government for
maintaining the law and order to create opportunities for the participants from the private sector.
The space of nancial sector reforms can also vary across countries.
The proper reforms of nancial markets improve e¢ ciency of nancial intermediation and brings
speedier rate of economic growth by linking the lending and borrowing rates to the fundamentals
of demand for and supply of funds; removing controls on credits; by creating right structure of
incentives for investors and depositors and freeing up the foreign exchange market from arbitrary
decisions and by making it subject to fundamentals of domestic and foreign markets. These
mechanism remove repressionary regimes with non inationary public nance for smooth process of
17
capital accumulation, increased liquidity, technical advancement and economic growth, elimination
of parallel markets and reducing the proportion of toxic non-performing assets. Liberation and
reform mechanisms thus are instrumental in reversing repressionary nancial regimes towards more
classical free enterprise economy that would promote accumulation and growth in these model
economies.
The general equilibrium model results presented above rely on classical economic principles in
which the self-adjusting mechanism of the real interest rates would balance demand for and supply
of nancial assets in a market driven economy and do not contain liquidity trap and credit crunch
situations as imagined by Keynes (1936). These results are consistent to literature that has emerged
since late 1960s on harmful impacts of nancial repressions in works of McKinnon (1968), Shaw
(1968), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and more recently in Boyd
and Jalal (2012).
Competitive nancial markets are perfect in allocating assets as all agents that have complete
information and are e¢ cient in processing such information. This assumption, however, is far from
perfect. Financial markets are full of asymmetric information, activities of one set of players depend
on actions taken by another set of players and the amount of information they have impacts on the
likely choices of others. This requires modelling of state contingent incentive compatible mechanisms
in this general equilibrium system and is an issue for further investigation.
On-going nancial sector reforms can be expected to make these economies more e¢ cient so
that the costs of funds decline in the counter factual experiments, where the taxes on the nancial
sectors are set to minimise distortions relative to the benchmark. Such measures will then result
in the higher rate of growth of output, employment and capital stock in almost all sectors even
with lower capita output ratios. The nancial liberalisation is paying for itself and welfare levels of
consumers improve with reforms rather than without it.
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5 Conclusion
Solutions of dynamic general equilibrium models of advanced countries Germany, France and UK
conrm that the nancial crises of 2008 occurred due to over-nancing problem. The actual nancial
deepening ratios (AFDR) exceeded by factors of 3.5, 2.4 and 5.1 to the optimal nancial deepening
ratios (OFDR) or by 7.8, 4.7 and 15.9 times of GDPs respectively for France, Germany and the UK
respectively. In contrast the emerging countries such as China and India with smaller OFDR and
AFDR were not only close to the e¢ ciency frontier but also were able to continue their impressive
growth rates at about 9.3 and 6.5 percents without being a¤ected by the global nancial crisis. While
the over-nancing (casino capitalism) problem was the cause of deep recession in advanced countries
observed after the crisis in 2008, such problem did not exist in emerging economies. Huge gaps
between the OFDR and AFDR cause massive macroeconomic uctuations; smaller gap allows faster
growth as these economies are close to the e¢ ciency frontier of nancial intermediation required
for economic stability and growth. Narrowing gaps between these two ratios required for smooth
and sustainable growth, emerging economies were more able to adopt the separating equilibrium
strategies in line of Miller-Stiglitz-Roth mechanisms to avoid the problem of asymmetric information
in process of nancial intermediation and capital accumulation than advanced economies.
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